In 2011, Mallozzi et al. [Fuzzy Sets and Systems 165(2011) 98-105] introduced a core-like concept (called F-core) and a balanced-like condition for games in which the worth of any coalition is given by means of a fuzzy interval. They proved that a balanced-like condition is necessary but not sufficient enough to guarantee the F-core to be non-empty. In this paper, we study deeply on this problem and, show the necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee the F-core to be non-empty. We also introduce a useful sufficient condition, average monotonic-like condition, to guarantee the F-core to be non-empty.
Introduction
In 1981, Aubin [1, 2] introduced the concept of cooperative fuzzy games based on fuzzy coalitions. and the games with its applications have been studied broadly since then(see [3, 6, 9, 10] ). Recently, Mallozzi et al. [8] extended the case of cooperative games with interval-valued characteristic function and considered games where the worth of any coalition is given by means of a fuzzy interval. They introduced a balanced-like condition and proved that this condition is necessary but not sufficient to guarantee the F-core to be nonempty. In this paper, we study this problem deeply and show the necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee the F-core to be non-empty. Moreover, we introduce another useful sufficient condition to guarantee the F-core to be non-empty.
Preliminaries
N = {1, 2, · · · , n} denotes the collection of subsets of N by 2 N . A cooperative game in coalition form is an ordered pair (N, u), where N = {1, 2, · · · , n} (the set of players) and u : 2 N → R is a map, assigning each coalition S ∈ 2 N a real number, such that u(φ) = 0, which is the characteristic function of the game and u(S) is called the worth of coalition.
A set of imputations of a cooperative game (N, u) is defined by I(u) = (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ) ∈ (R) N : i∈N x i = u (N ) and x i ≥ u(i), ∀i ∈ N and C(u) denotes the core of the game u defined by
A game (N, u) is called balanced game if for any map λ : S ⊂ N → λ(S) ∈ R + such that S⊂N,i∈S λ(S) = 1,
Theorem 2.1 [3] . Let (N, u) be a game. Then the following two assertions are equivalent:
We denote IR a set of non-empty and compact real intervals,
We consider the order relation and the algebraic operations. A partial order relation , is defined as:
A B ⇔ a ≥ b and a ≥ b, A B ⇔ a > b and a > b, which coincide with the usual order on R on the set of degenerate intervals. The sum defined by:
A + B = a + b, a + b and the product with a non-negative real number λ is defined as
A fuzzy set F in R is characterized by a real-valued function µ F defined on R "which associates with each point in R a real number in the interval [0, 1], with the value of µ F (x) at x representing the grade of membership of x in F " [4] . The function µ F is called membership function of the fuzzy set F . Let F be a fuzzy set in R with membership function µ F . A fuzzy interval is a fuzzy set F with the following properties;
(
be a set of fuzzy intervals, and if we define [5] ) implies that we can identify a fuzzy interval F with the parameterized representation of 
The sum and scalar multiplication on F(R) are defined by the sup-min convolution as follows [4] . Let F 1 , F 2 , · · · , F n be fuzzy intervals with membership functions µ F 1 , µ F 2 , · · · , µ Fn and let λ i ∈ R, i = 1, · · · , n: the sum λ 1 F 1 + · · · + λ n F n is the fuzzy interval which has the membership function µ λ 1 F 1 +···+λnFn defined by sup-min convolution below
where the symbol ∧ denotes the minimum. Moreover, this sum have following property:
non-increasing such that the membership function µ F is given as below(see [7] ):
A real compact interval [a, a] is identified with the fuzzy interval having the following membership function:
and the null fuzzy interval, denoted by 0, is the fuzzy interval with the membership function
The fuzzy interval is then denoted by
A fuzzy interval is said to be trapezoidal if the functions L and R in (2) are linear. The α-level set of a trapezoidal fuzzy interval with membership function µ is given by
and is denoted by
We use the binary relation ¤ and £ defined on F(R) to compare fuzzy intervals as recalled below(see [7, 9, 10] ):
Mallozzi et al. [8] approached the concept of cooperative fuzzy game in a fuzzy interval setting by assuming that each coalition worth a fuzzy interval.
A fuzzy interval-valued cooperative game (or a fuzzy interval cooperative game) is a pair (N, U), which U : 2 N → F(R) assigns each coalition S into fuzzy intervals F(R) with U (∅) = 0.
In the following, let us underline that the sums are in the sense of sup-min convolution.
A set of imputations of a fuzzy interval cooperative game (N, U) is defined by
Now, we introduce a core for fuzzy interval cooperative games.
Definition 2.1 [8] . The fuzzy interval core C F (U) of a fuzzy interval cooperative game (N, U) is a subset of imputations which is stable against any possible deviation by fuzzy coalition and defined as
for any map λ : S ⊂ N → λ(S) ∈ R + such that i∈S⊂N λ(S) = 1.
Cores of fuzzy interval cooperative games
Mallozzi et al. [8] introduced a balanced condition for trapezoidal fuzzy interval cooperative games, i.e. fuzzy interval games such that U(S) is a trapezoidal fuzzy interval for any coalition S, which is an extension of the well known Bondareva-Shapley's condition for TU-games. Differently from the setting of interval cooperative games, Mallozzi et al. [8] showed that the F-balanced condition is not sufficient for the existence of F-core elements. In this section, we give a necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee a F-core to be nonempty.
The following result is due to Mallozzi et al. [8] .
Proposition 3.1 [8] . If trapezoidal fuzzy interval cooperative game has nonempty F-core, then it is F-balanced.
Note. Let (N, U) be a fuzzy interval cooperative game and let
Proposition 3.2. Let (N, U) be a trapezoidal fuzzy interval cooperative game. Proof. We suppose that (N, U) is F-balanced
for any map λ : S ⊂ N → λ(S) ∈ R + such that S⊂N,i∈S λ(S) = 1.
Mallozzi et al. [8] proved that F-balanced condition is necessary but not sufficient to guarantee the F-core to be non-empty. Similarly, the following example shows that The condition that C( 
and
. It is easy to find that
where
is not a trapezoidal fuzzy interval which is a contradiction.
In the following result, we show that F-balanced condition with some special relationship among each α-level cores is necessary and sufficient to guarantee the F-core to be non-empty. Theorem 3.5. Let (N, U) be a trapezoidal fuzzy interval cooperative game.
We also have a generalization of Theorem 3.5 for fuzzy interval cooperative game, because of Theorem 2.2. The method of the proof is almost same. We omit the proof. 
4 Average monotonic fuzzy interval cooperative games
In this section, we introduce a sufficient condition to guarantee the F-core to be non-empty. We will focus on a subclass of Average monotonic fuzzy interval cooperative games. A cooperative game u is called monotonic if for any S, S ⊂ N with S ⊂ S , u(S) ≤ u(S ). A cooperative game u is superadditive if the following holds: 
where a(S) = i∈S a i and a(T ) = i∈T a i . If conditions (i) and (ii) hold we will say that u is an average monotonic fuzzy interval cooperative game with respect to the vector a.
The following result is due to Izquierdo and Rafels [6] .
Proposition 4.1 [6] . Let u be an average monotonic cooperative games with respect to a. Then the following are satisfied:
( 
where a(S) = i∈S a i and a(T ) = i∈T a i . If conditions (i) and (ii) hold we will say that U is an average monotonic fuzzy interval cooperative game with respect to the vector a. Notice that 0 ≤ a(S) ≤ a(T ) for S ⊂ T and a (N ) > 0. If a(S) > 0, we may write (3) as
A cooperative fuzzy interval cooperative game U is superadditive if the following holds:
for any pair of coalitions S, T ⊂ N such that S ∪ T = φ. The following properties are very useful in determining whether a fuzzy game might be average monotonic with respect to a certain vector as these are necessary conditions. 
if and only if for any α ∈ [0, 1],
That is, both U α and U α are superadditive for any α ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, the result follows.
The following lemma is immediate. Proof. It is direct from Proposition 4.1 using Lemma 4.2 and 4.3.
Definition 4.3. Let U be an average monotonic fuzzy interval cooperative with respect to a. We define the fuzzy proportional distribution p(U; a) = (p i (U; a)) i=1,2,...,n as p i (U; a) = a i U (N ) a (N ) , i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Next, we use the fuzzy proportional distribution to show that an average monotonic fuzzy interval cooperative game has a nonempty Aubin core. and (F 1 , F 2 , F 3 ) ∈ C F (U).
